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AVENUES FOR ADDRESSING THE EXPLOITATION OF
INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCESS BY THIRD PARTIES
Yishi Yin*
An innovative new technique for gaming the financial markets
emerged in late 2014 when a hedge fund manager began filing
inter partes review petitions with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office against pharmaceutical companies in an attempt
to profit from the short selling of pharmaceutical stocks. The
pharmaceutical industry deemed this practice an abuse of process
and attempted to regulate and deter these tactics by protesting to
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to sanction those who use the
strategy and for the Patent and Trademark office to issue a new
policy banning the strategy. However, the Board declined to
impose sanctions on hedge fund manager Kyle Bass for abuse of
process. Options to halt the strategy include Congressional action,
agency action, and Judicial Review of the Patent and Trademark
Office’s ruling. This Recent Development will present means of
regulating this activity and ultimately argue that the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board made the best decision by leaving the issue for
Congressional action.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is
the federal agency responsible for granting United States patents in
accordance with Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the U.S.
Constitution to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1

*

J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017.
1
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; About Us, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
about-us (last visited Oct. 20 2015).
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In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (“AIA”) and established broad patent reform. 2 One of the
reforms was the establishment of the inter partes review (“IPR”)
system for challenging the validity of patents at the USPTO
through the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”).3 As part of
an investment strategy, the manager of the hedge fund Hayman
Capital Management LP, Kyle Bass, targeted pharmaceutical drug
patents with IPR petitions primarily as a method to short sell
stocks.4 Bass filed the IPRs using a series of shell companies he
created as limited liability companies (“LLC”).5
The LLCs are named the Coalition for Affordable Drugs
(“CFAD”) and serve the purpose to invalidate weak
pharmaceutical patents so generic pharmaceutical companies can
move in and lower drug prices, while also serving his own purpose
in enabling him to short sell related stock.6 Bass and his CFADs
have filed more than thirty-two IPR petitions and, regardless of the
IPR outcomes, show no sign of slowing down.7 Bass’s actions have

2

See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 341 (2011).
3
Id. For a description of IPR and the PTAB, see infra, Part II.
4
For a description of short selling stocks, see infra, Part II.A.
5
Don Seiffert, Kyle Bass has lost a battle, but not the war, in his fight with
Big
Pharma,
BOSTON
BUSINESS
JOURNAL
(Sept.
1,
2015),
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/bioflash/2015/09/kyle-bass-has-lost-abattle-but-not-the-war-in.html. Bass has announced that his Coalitions are
additionally meant to introduce cheaper generics by invalidating weak patents
that drive drug prices up; however, he has also commented that motive is
“incidental” to his hedge fund managing strategy. Id. For a detailed discussion
on shorting stock, see infra, Part II.B.
6
Ed Silverstein, Should hedge funds have standing in IPR?, INSIDE COUNSEL
(July 22, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/07/22/should-hedge-fundshave-standing-in-ipr.
7
Kristel Schorr et al., The Road Ahead For Kyle Bass’s IPRs, LAW360 (Aug. 28,
2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/696911/the-road-ahead-for-kyle-bass-siprs; Susan Decker, Bass Vows to Keep Fighting U.S. Drug Patents After Setbacks,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 03, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-09-03/bass-vows-to-keep-fighting-u-s-drug-patents-after-setbacks.
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caused some pharmaceutical companies to cry abuse,8 and a few
targeted companies have filed for sanctions 9 or argue in
preliminary responses that there is an abuse of process.10 Despite
immense success in bringing down stock prices with his first three
IPR challenges by just filing the challenge, the market seems to
have either adjusted to Bass’s tactics or learned about the possible
volatility of patents, as his later challenges have not all led to a
significant decrease in stock prices of the targeted companies.11
The PTAB tackled the issue of using the IPR process to short stock
head-on in a ruling denying sanctions, stating that “[p]rofit is at the
heart of nearly every patent and nearly every inter partes review.”12
More recently, the PTAB has instituted review on seven of
CFAD’s petitions, 13 as well as another hedge fund’s petition,
giving some credence to the investment strategy.14 However, the

8

Schorr et al., supra note 7. “Biotechnology Industry Organization’s (BIO)
president and CEO Jim Greenwood has said, ‘Billionaire hedge fund manager
Kyle Bass continues to attack biotechnology companies with endless series of
IPR . . . challenges to legitimate patents. . . . His abuse of this system highlights
the need for reform.’” Ed Silverstein, Bass wins single victory at PTAB but
questions remain who will lose ‘war’, INSIDE COUNSEL (October 2015).
9
Id.
10
Decker, supra note 7, at 3.
11
See J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog, Attack of The Shorting Bass: Does
the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns?,
63 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse (forthcoming Nov. 2015).
12
Ryan Davis, Hedge Fund Gets PTAB To Eye VirnetX Patents In Apple
Case, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/712078/hedgefund-gets-ptab-to-eye-virnetx-patents-in-apple-case; Lisa Shuchman, Kyle Bass
Wins a Procedural Victory in Battle Against Big Pharma, CORPORATE
COUNSEL. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202738395997/
Kyle-Bass-Wins-a-Procedural-Victory-in-Battle-Against-Big-Pharma?slreturn=
20151006134353.
13
Tasha M. Francis, Kyle Bass Group Gets PTAB to Review 4 Celgene
Patents, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=f426cc1a-ce41-4347-8640-9e1049f5a6c4.
14
Matthew Bultman, Hedge Fund Group Gets Review Of Bowel Disease Drug
Patent, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/712592/ hedgefund-group-gets-review-of-bowel-disease-drug-patent; Davis, supra note 12.

17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 110
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review
fear is that this investment strategy could spur copycat15 financiers
to adopt his strategy and clog the IPR proceedings with dubious
petitions backed by pure financial motivations and stymying
innovation by introducing a next-generation IPR troll. 16 This
Recent Development argues that the USPTO’s policy, revealed in
the PTAB’s recent ruling, is correct because the PTAB did not act
and contravene express statutes, despite the USPTO having the
power to address the issue with more force that lies within its
Constitutional charge, 17 delegated powers, 18 and status as a
“custodian of knowledge.” Furthermore, this Recent Development
addresses other avenues for dealing with the “next-generation ‘IPR
troll[s]’”,19 such as Congressional action, Securities and Exchange
Commission and USPTO action, and judicial review.
Part II introduces how the current laws and regulations operate,
including short sales, IPR petitions, and the motivations for its
implementation. Part III discusses Bass’s strategy and the
exploitation of the IPR process for pecuniary gain. Part IV
evaluates whether any intervention is required. Part V addresses
methods the USPTO could employ to respond to the exploitation
of the IPR system. Part VI concludes that that the USPTO and
PTAB were in waiting for Congress to provide guidance and
address the issue while deciding the IPR petitions based on the
merits of the claims.

15

Some other hedge funds and financiers have filed petitions in order to short
stock. See Michelle Carniaux, PTAB Crashers: A Look at how they are doing in
the PTAB, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=89b0247b-5614-4819-a0f2-bd3f999e6a4e.
16
Joseph Allen, It’s Time to Whack ‘IPR Trolls’, IPWATCHDOG (June 22, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/22/its-time-to-whack-ipr-trolls/id=58902/.
17
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries[.]” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18
See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012).
19
Schorr et al., supra note 7, at 26.
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II.

SHORT SALES, THE AIA, AND INTER PARTES REVIEW

A. Short Selling of Stocks
With the 2008 recession still fresh in mind, the country
continues to scrutinize and criticize the activities of Wall Street,
including the practice of short selling.20 Investments in stocks can
be split into two categories: long and short.21 When an investor
“goes long,” they are betting that the stock will gradually increase
in price, and plan to gain from selling at a higher price. 22
Conversely, when they “go short,” they are taking the gamble that
the stock price will decrease in the near future.23 In a typical short
sale, a seller borrows shares of stock and then sells stock that he or
she believes will fall in price. After the stock price has fallen, the
short seller then re-purchases the stock at the lower price,24 and
returns the stock to the lender.25 If the buy-back price is lower than
the selling price, the short seller gains a profit, which is the
difference between the selling price and the buy-back price, from
that transaction. The short selling of stocks was once deemed “the
greatest evil that has been permitted or sanctioned by the

20

Short selling in the struggling financial industry was widely debated to be a
major contributor to the 2008 market crash and subsequent recession, one still
fresh in the minds of public. Emilios Avgouleas, A New Framework for the
Global Regulation of Short Sales: Why Prohibition is Inefficient and Disclosure
Insufficient, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 376, 380 (2010).
21
Short
Selling:
What
is
Short
Selling?,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling1.asp (last visited
Oct. 31, 2015).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
There is no requirement to re-purchase the stock from the buyer. For
instance, the short seller can simply purchase the amount of borrowed stock
from any seller in the market.
25
Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium on the Regulation of Secondary Trading
Markets: Program Trading, Volatility, Portfolio Insurance, and the Role of
Specialists and Market Makers: Restrictions on Short Sales: an Analysis of the
Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1989). For regulation of short sales, see
generally 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2015).
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Government . . . .” 26 Some conventional investors view short
sellers negatively because they are betting on bad news, such as a
company’s economic struggle. 27 Some also believe that short
sellers are heavy contributors to market crashes and recessions,
partly because they gain tremendously—while most investors lose
financially—when stock prices drop, and because they capitalize
on market fear and panic.28 There are even a few “bad apples” that
take the short position on a stock and disseminate unsubstantiated
rumors and bad news to drive down stock prices and gain from the
artificially low price of the stock.29
Despite the negative perception of short sales, “a large number
of empirical studies indicate that short selling is an important
factor of market efficiency when it comes to pricing of securities
and rapid dissemination of unpublished information.”30 However,
one persistent concern is the possibility of using short sales “in
order to . . . act profitably on inside information.”31 While the fear
of market manipulation and threat of insider trading exists, those

26

Short Selling of Securities: Hearings on H.R. 4, H.R. 4604, H.R. 4638, H.R.
4639 Before the H. Comm’n on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7
(1932).
27
Bridget Yullie, Short Selling: Ethics and the Role of Short Selling,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling4.asp
(last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
28
Id.
29
Id. See generally Rick Wayman, The Short and Distort: Stock Manipulation
in a Bear Market, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/
030102.asp (Last Visited Oct. 31, 2015); David P. McCaffery, Review of The
Policy Debate Over Short Sale Regulation During the Market Crisis, 73.2 Alb.
L.
Rev.
483
(2010),
http://www.albany.edu/McCaffrey-Short-SaleRegulation.pdf. In recent news, “Biotech bad boy” Martin Shkreli had also
attempted a similar hedge fund strategy as Bass, but instead petitioned Food and
Drug Administration to not approve drugs while holding those pharmaceutical
companies’ stocks in a short position. Ed Silverman, Biotech exec Martin
Shkreli has a history of tough tactics, BOS. GLOBE (September 26, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/09/25/how-martin-shkreli-biotechpariah-put-cancer-patients-risk/fxjUV8alj28LESmmOF7IbO/story.html.
30
Avgouleas, supra note 20, at 379, 403.
31
Id. at 379.
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issues are under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchanges
Commission (“SEC”).32
B. The AIA and IPR
In 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) was
signed into law by President Obama with broad patent reform in
mind. One stated purpose was to “establish a more efficient and
streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and
limit unnecessary and counter-productive litigation costs.”33 The
AIA changed the United States patent filing system from a first-toinvent system to a first-to-file system mirroring the laws of many
other countries, which also reduced litigation costs by reducing
interference proceedings. 34 Among other changes, the AIA also
created a “toolbox of new or fortified proceedings” to “weed out”
suspect or “low quality” patents that should have never been
initially issued, which the IPR proceeding is a part of.35 An IPR
allows any person or company to request that the USPTO, through
32

“[A]ll investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should
have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so
long as they hold it.” The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation. SEC: WHAT WE
DO. http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
33
See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on LeahySmith America Invents Act (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
press/senate-begins-debate-on-leahy-smith-america-invents-act.
34
A patent is available as prior art on the date the patent or patent application
was effectively filed, the actual date, or the earliest application date if the patent
or patent application is entitled to claim a right of foreign priority or domestic
benefit and describes the subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012); America
Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED STATES PATENTED AND
TRADE OFFICE, www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-inventsact-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked. Interference proceedings were
previously used to determine the priority of inventions, (who invented what
first). It was estimated that the proceeding would cost an average of $600,000,
which generally only wealthy inventors or corporations could afford. See Gene
Quinn, Change? Derviation May Feel a Lot Like Interference Practice,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/09/changederviation-may-feel-a-lot-like-interference-practice/id=24020/.
35
Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
487, 498-99 (Dec. 2012).
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the PTAB,36 review a granted patent to reconsider whether the
challenged patent satisfies two conditions for patentability: novelty
and non-obviousness.37 A person who is not the owner of a patent
is able to file a petition to institute an IPR of a patent, and if there
is a reasonable likelihood that a petitioner can prevail with at least
one of the claims in the petition challenged, review will be
instituted.38 If review is instituted, the petitioner has the burden of
proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a patent
claim is invalid.39 In line with the mission of the AIA to streamline
the system, the IPR procedure ensures that the PTAB will aim to
contemplate more petitions by requiring the PTAB to reach a
decision in instituting review within three months of receiving a
patent owner’s preliminary response to petition,40 and reach final
decisions of validity in not over one year since the date of

36

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board was created by 35 U.S.C. § 6, and it is
the judicial arm of the USPTO. The Board’s duties consist of:
(1) on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of
examiners upon applications for patents pursuant to section 134(a);
(2) review appeals of reexaminations pursuant to section 134(b);
(3) conduct derivation proceedings pursuant to section 135; and
(4) conduct inter partes reviews and post-grant reviews pursuant to
chapters 31 and 32.
35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2012).
37
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012). For an invention to be novel, it must not
be described in any other patent, printed publication, or widely known; for an
invention to be non-obvious, it should display “ingenuity beyond the compass”
of a person of ordinary skill in the art, meaning that the differences between the
invention and any prior art must not be so trivial that one of ordinary skill in the
art could easily see it is already known in whole, or in part from separate
references. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2012); UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO Inter Partes Review, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
38
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Inter Partes Review,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/tri
als/inter-partes-review (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
39
35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
40
Or if the patent owner chooses not to file a preliminary response, the last
date of response eligibility. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012).
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institution of review.41 IPR is often considerably less expensive
than full litigation.42 One reason IPR can be less expensive and
more expedient than patent litigation is because courts often
repeatedly grant a stay if there happens to be any pending litigation
within the district courts, conserving resources while waiting for
the “tech-savvy” PTAB to come to a decision.43 Adding to the
price and speed calculus is the fact that IPR proceedings have a
lower standard of proof than at trial for determining a patent
claim’s validity: a preponderance of the evidence.44 The reduction

41

35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012). As of September 14, 2014, IPR petitions
have seen an average 75 petitions per month, compared to 12.5 Inter Partes
Reexamination (“IPX”) petitions per month; IPR decisions are, on average,
rendered within 15 months, compared the average 36 months under IPX. See
Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014).
42
For example, Engellenger estimates IPR proceedings to cost roughly
$300,000–500,000, while full litigation could be from $2 million - $6 million.
Tom Engellenger, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Comparison of Federal
Court, ITC, and USPTO Proceedings in IP Disputes, slide 31. (Jan. 2014),
http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-inJapan/Commit
tee%20Documents/2014%20MWI%20Presentations/Tom%20Engellenner%20%20IP%20Dispute%20Cost%20Comparison.ppt. See generally Eric W.
Schweibenz et al., Automatic Stay of Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review?: A
Simple Proposal for Solving the Patent Troll Riddle, 7 ABA SECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LANDSLIDE 1LAW (2014), http://www.oblon.com/
content/uploads/2015/08/ABA_LAND_v007n01__automatic_stay_of_litigation
_pending_inter_partes_review_a_simple_proposal_for_solving_the_patent_troll
_riddle-authcheckdam.pdf.
43
Schweibenz et al., supra note 42 at 2–3. Courts usually use a three factor
test to determine whether a stay in proceedings is appropriate: (1) the stage of
the litigation, (2) simplification of the issues in or at trial, and (3) whether a stay
will create undue prejudice to the nonmoving party or a clear tactical advantage
to the moving party. See Telemac Corp. v. Teledigital, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d
1107, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006). There is a “liberal policy in favor of granting
motions to stay proceedings pending the outcome of USPTO reexamination or
reissuance proceedings.” ASCII Corp. v. STD Entnmen’t USA, Inc., 844 F.
Supp. 1378, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
44
The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that one or more claims of the patent in suit are invalid. At court, there
is a presumption of validity of a granted patent against which the alleged
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in cost and time make IPR an attractive vehicle for hedge fund
managers, such as Bass, that have taken short positions on
pharmaceutical stocks and are looking to manipulate share prices
for profit.45
The USPTO has limited resources. The USPTO’s budget,
although set by Congress, comes entirely from the fees it collects
instead of taxpayer dollars.46 Because of the constrained budget,
manpower is also limited.47 Compounding the limited resources is
the growing popularity of IPRs; IPR petitions have increased from
an average of forty-one per month, in fiscal year 2013, to 142 per
month in fiscal year 2015.48
The hedge fund strategy of CFAD and its copycats is not
entirely aligned with the stated goals of the AIA, or the overall
goals of the patent system given the resources of the USPTO. The
IPR process is susceptible to exploitation because IPR petitions are
more enticing than full-blown litigation; any third parties, for
instance, financiers, are allowed to challenge patent validity. IPR
petitions already comprise 90% of total petitions before the

infringer then bears the burden of disproving by clear and convincing evidence.
Sidak & Skog, supra note 11, at 5.
45
Id. at 5–6.
46
The budget for the US Patent and Trademark Office is set before the office
knows know how much is collected in fees. For instance, the fee for IPR petition
request for up to 20 claims is $9,000. This goes to the Patent and Trademark Fee
Reserve Fund, and can be accessed upon Congressional grant, if the Office has
collected more fees than the budget set. Ryan Davis, Obama Budget Calls For
$252M Less For USPTO, LAW360, (Feb. 2, 2015, 4:39 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/617421/obama-budget-calls-for-252m-less-foruspto; see also Patent Trial and Appeal Fees, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last visited Nov.
23, 2015).
47
If the budget is set, salaries and the number of examiners are set. In 2014,
there were 9,302 patent examiners. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
FISCAL YEAR 2014 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11 (2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf.
48
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3 (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/2015-04-30%20PTAB.pdf.
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PTAB.49 CFAD’s tactics will undermine the agency’s ability to
efficiently and effectively deal with patent challenges through IPR
because CFAD is consuming the USPTO’s resources for purely
financial gain without any interest in using a particular technology
or in innovation by further development. Other copycats have
already adopted his method and have filed IPR petitions while
taking the short position, which will further slow down the IPR
process and PTAB proceedings.50 Because the PTAB requires a
decision on institution to be within three months of response and
any final decision to be within a year of institution, the PTAB
might become inundated with these types of IPR petitions if they
continuously receive more IPR petitions. The PTAB may also
struggle to give full attention to each petition, unless the USPTO
massively expands the PTAB. Other concerns motivating the
passage of the AIA, such as attempts to curtail short selling, will be
discussed in Parts III and IV.51
III.
COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE DRUGS’ STRATEGY
Although certainly not the first to capitalize on market
uneasiness,52 Bass has ingeniously constructed his strategy. Instead
of filing IPR petitions under his holding company, Hayman Capital
Management, he files his IPR petitions using one of his shell
CFADs. 53 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) has been interpreted to give any
person the ability to challenge a patent;54 this allows an entity such
49

Id. at 2.
Davis, supra note 12.
51
See infra Part III and Part IV.
52
William A. Ackman, a hedge fund manager, is using a similar tactic by
undermining market confidence in Herbalife with threats of legal action and
lobbying efforts, all the while taking the short position on its stock. Michael S.
Schmidt et al., After Big Bet, Hedge Fund Pulls the Levers of Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/business/staking-1billion-that-herbalife-will-fail-then-ackman-lobbying-to-bring-it-down.html?_r=1.
53
Sidak & Skog, supra note 11; his CFADs are registered limited liability
companies.
54
Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI,
LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015).
50
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as a hedge fund to file an IPR petition. 55 Although the actual
motivation behind the use of a CFAD instead of his hedge fund
company is not entirely clear, Bass contends that his CFADs were
formed for a legitimate and altruistic rationale: to challenge “weak
patents in an effort to lower drug prices.” 56 Instead, the
pharmaceutical industry contends that Bass and other hedge fund
managers are filing these IPR petitions in order to create market
fear about the viability of a pharmaceutical company’s patents,
which drives down stock prices. 57 They suggest that there is
“nothing in this man’s history to suggest he has any interest in
lowering health-care costs,” and point out his partnership with
well-known “patent-troll” 58 Erich Spangenberg. 59 Drug company
Celgene,60 one of Bass’s targets, filed a motion for sanctions61 in
55

“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who is not the owner of
a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of
the patent.” See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012).
56
Tasha Francis, Kyle Bass’ IPRs: Are You Next?, FISH & RICHARDSON (Sept.
8, 2015), http://fishpostgrant.com/alert/kyle-bass-iprs-are-you-next/.
57
Shuchman, supra note 12.
58
A patent troll is usually someone who has no interest in the technology or
industry, but buys weak and dubious patents and then threatens litigation
utilizing those patents as a weapon. Their targets are either tolled a licensing fee
or settlement fee to avoid costly litigation. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue:
An Alert to Corporate America (July 13, 2013), N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alert-tocorporate-america.html; Matteo Sabatini, NPEs vs. Patent Trolls: How to Build
a Healthy Innovation Ecosystem, IPWATCHDOG, (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/04/npe-patent-trolls-innovation-ecosystem/
id=54427/ (Non-practicing entities (NPEs) are patent owners that have no
interest in using or developing the patented invention, although not all NPEs are
patent trolls.).
59
Erich Spangenberg has been called “one of the most notorious patent trolls
in America” and is infamous within the patent-troll world. Earning over $25
million a year with IPNav, his business mainly centered on trolling patents,
which has sued 1,638 companies as of 2013. Segal, supra note 58; Joseph
Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short
the Stock, WSJ (April 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fundmanager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408.
60
See About Celgene, CELGENE CORP., https://www.celgene.com/about/ (last
visited Nov. 23, 2015).
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the PTAB criticizing Bass for his activities, claiming that his
CFADs and his altruistic motives are a “front” and his motives a
“pretext” for manipulating stock prices and profiting from shorting
their stock.62 In response to the motion for sanctions from Celgene,
CFAD stated its petitions “are part of its investment strategy, and
[CFAD] will only succeed by invalidating patents, serving the
socially valuable purpose of reducing drug prices artificially priced
above the socially optimum level.”63
A. Early Failures of Institution
In late August 2015, the PTAB declined to institute two of
Bass’s earlier IPR petitions against Acorda Therapeutics and its
Multiple Sclerosis (“MS”) drug Ampyra.64 CFAD claimed that two
posters presented at meetings qualified as prior art under 35 U.S.C.
61

Patent Owner Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6) and
37 C.F.R. § 42.12, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.,
IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. July 28, 2015); sanctions under 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.12(a)(6) state that the PTAB may impose a sanction against a party for
abuse of process. Section 42.12(b) lists possible sanctions, and the most
applicable sanctions are: “[a]n order providing for compensatory expenses,
including attorney fees” and “[j]udgment in the trial or dismissal of the
petition.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(b) (2015); “[i]n all [thirteen] cases in which a Patent
Owner Preliminary Response has been filed to date, the patent owner has argued
that CFAD’s petition is an abuse of process or otherwise contrary to the
underlying intent of the AIA. In five cases, the patent owner has filed a separate
motion for sanctions based on abuse of process, and in at least one other case,
the PTAB has authorized the patent owner to file such a motion.” Schorr et al.,
supra note 7. The Director of the USPTO has the power to prescribe sanctions
for “abuse of discovery, abuse of process, or any other improper use of the
proceeding, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or an unnecessary
increase in the cost of the proceeding.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6) (2012).
62
Beth Winegarner, Celgene Calls Kyle Bass’ AIA Review Bids ‘Harassment’,
LAW360 (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/701833.
63
Davis, supra note 12.
64
Decision Denying IPR, Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v.
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., IPR2015-00817 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter Decision Denying IPR, Coalition for Affordable Drugs]; Erin Coe,
Hedge Fund Manager Loses IPR Bids Against Acorda, LAW360 (Aug. 24,
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/694762/hedge-fund-manager-loses-iprbids-against-acorda.
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§ 102(b).65 The PTAB denied review based on the fact that CFAD
failed to establish a reasonable likelihood it would prevail with at
least one of their claims within the petition.66 In early September
2015, the PTAB also declined to institute a review of a third IPR
against Biogen MA (“Biogen”) and its MS drug Tecfidera.67 The
PTAB stated the reason for denying the IPR was “based on
petitioner’s failure to establish a likelihood of success as to any
challenged claim.” 68 The PTAB did not address arguments
surrounding an abuse of process investigation through Biogen’s
motion for additional discovery, going so far as stating in the
Biogen case that “additional discovery . . . would be inconsistent
with a speedy and inexpensive resolution”69 based on 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.1(b).70
B. Validation as an Investment Strategy
In early October 2015, CFAD and other hedge funds71 were
awarded two significant victories for their use of IPR as an
investment strategy. One was the denial of a motion for sanctions
in the Celgene case.72 Celgene filed a motion for sanctions in front
of the PTAB that alleged that CFAD’s and Bass’s investment
strategy was an abuse of process.73 Celgene explained that the
USPTO has not adopted any standards for what constitutes an
abuse of process for IPRs, but suggested that an abuse of process
65

Decision Denying IPR, Coalition for Affordable Drugs, supra note 64 at 5.
Id. at 2.
67
Coalition for Affordable Drugs V, LLC v. Biogen MA, Inc., IPR201501136 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Coalition for Affordable Drugs V];
Matthew Bultman, PTAB Denies Hedge Fund’s Bid For Biogen Patent Review,
LAW360 (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/698466/ptab-denieshedge-fund-s-bid-for-biogen-patent-review.
68
Coalition for Affordable Drugs V, supra note 67 at 16.
69
Id.
70
Id.; 37 C.F.R § 42.1(b) (2015) (stating “[t]his part shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding”).
71
Another hedge fund is Mangrove Partners Masters Fund. Infra notes 87–91.
72
See generally Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable
Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015).
73
Id. at 2.
66
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occurs when a party perverts a “lawfully initiated process to
illegitimate ends.”74 They argued that allowing CFAD to continue
to file IPR petitions would result in an “unwarranted burden” on
the PTAB, as well as other innovators.75 Celgene centered their
arguments on three points: (1) the fact that CFAD had no
underlying interest whatsoever on the technology contained in the
patent, or any interest in the industry targeted; (2) the purposes of
the AIA in establishing IPR was to decrease cost and time, and
CFAD’s activity ran counter to this purpose; and (3) the fact that
profit was the ulterior motive behind the IPR petitions. 76 On
Celgene’s first point, the PTAB determined that Congress chose
not to impose a requirement of specific interest in the technology
covered by the patent when the PTAB interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 311,
and this was consistent with standing principles in front of
agencies.77 With regard to the Celgene’s second point, the purpose
of the AIA and the newly introduced IPR procedure, the PTAB
held that Congress did not only intend for the IPR process to be a
less costly alternative, but also to streamline the patent system and
improve patent quality. Therefore any meritorious challenge is
adequate under the AIA’s stated goals.78 To Celgene’s third point,
the PTAB chose to not take any position with regards to the profit
motive, stating that “[p]rofit was at the heart of nearly every patent
74

Patent Owner Motion for Sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI,
LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. July 28, 2015) (citing Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.5 (1994)).
75
Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI,
LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter
Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI].
76
Id. at 2–3.
77
Id. at 4 (citing Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002))
(stating that an administrative agency is not subject to Article III of the
Constitution of the United States, so a petitioner would have no need to establish
standing to participate in proceedings before the agency); see also Consumer
Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Res. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(citing Sierra Club).
78
Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, supra note 75 at 4–5 Celgene did not
allege that CFAD filed unmeritorious petitions in their motion for sanctions. Id.
The PTAB declined to establish explicit elements for abuse of process, but
decided that claims with merit are not sanctionable. Id.

17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 122
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review
and nearly every [IPR].”79 The PTAB went on to grant institution
of CFAD’s petitions against Celgene’s drug patents, but declined
to expound on the issue of exploitation.80
The other significant win was a successful institution of review
stemming from CFAD’s IPR petition against Cosmo.81 Cosmo’s
preliminary response addressed the CFAD’s claims by arguing that
they failed to meet the reasonable likelihood standard, but also
attacked the CFAD by requesting that the IPR petition be
dismissed because the CFAD failed to reveal all real parties in
interest (“RPI”)82 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), which states
that an IPR petition “may be considered only if . . . the petition
identifies all [RPI].”83 Cosmo began by arguing that the CFAD’s
79

Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene
Corp., IPR2015-01092, (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015); Decision, Coalition for
Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01096 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27,
2015); see also Francis, supra note 13.
81
Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. Cosmo Technologies
Ltd., IPR2015-00988 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2015).
82
Who constitutes a RPI is a highly fact-dependent question; there is no
bright-line test for determining the necessary quantity or degree of participation
to qualify as a RPI based on the control concept. See Gonzalez v. Banco Cent.
Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 759 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States Patent and
Trademark Office, Message from Chief Judge James Donald Smith, Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences: USPTO Discusses Key Aspects of New
Administrative
Patent
Trials,
USPTO
(May
21,
2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/mess
age-chief-judge-james-donald-smith-board#heading-2. “Accordingly, the Office
has not enumerated particular factors regarding a ‘control’ theory of [RPI] . . . in
the proposed rules. Instead, to resolve a real party in interest or privy dispute
that may arise during a proceeding, the Board plans to consider each case on its
specific facts.” Id.
83
“By neglecting to identify all of the ‘wealthy individuals and institutions’
invested in Mr. Bass’ fund and the myriad entities he has engaged to file such
petitions, Petitioner has failed to comply with the explicit requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 312(a)(2).” Patent Owner Prelim. Resp., Coalition for Affordable
Drugs II LLC v. Cosmo Technologies Ltd., No. IPR2015-00988 (P.T.A.B. Oct.
7, 2015). See generally Krishan Thakker & Eldora L. Ellison, The Curious Case
of RPIs & NPEs in IPRs, 90 PTCJ 3049 (Aug. 28, 2015). “There are multiple
factors relevant to an RPI or privy inquiry, including the ‘existence of a
80
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failure to disclose their sister CFADs, parent companies, as well as
any investors that sponsor CFAD’s actions, is fatal to their
petition.84 Cosmo ended its response by arguing that policy dictates
that investors be disclosed as RPI in order to ensure “that IPRs are
not used as tools for harassment . . . through repeated litigation and
administrative attacks on the validity of a patent, which would
divert resources from the research and development of
inventions.”85 The PTAB reviewed on the merits in favor of the
CFAD, but addressed the issue of RPI by finding that there was
insufficient evidence that sister CFADs were required to be listed
as RPI, and that investors were also too speculative to be required
to be listed for this proceeding.86
Also in October, a second hedge fund, Mangrove Partners
Master Fund, was granted review for its IPR petition over VirnetX
Inc., an Internet security company.87 In their preliminary response,
VirnetX, similar to Cosmo, also attacked the petition by requesting
that the PTAB dismiss the petition because Mangrove Fund failed
to list all RPIs, including investors.88 Again, the PTAB ruled that
there was insufficient evidence to require Mangrove Fund to do so
at that stage of the proceeding.89 Furthermore, Mangrove Fund was
financially controlling interest in the Petitioner’; the non- party’s ‘relationship
with the Petitioner’; the nonparty’s ‘relationship to the petition itself, including
the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing’ (i.e., the amount of control
and/or funding of the proceeding); and ‘the nature of the entity filing the
petition.’” Id. at 2. The identity of RPIs is important because there a statutory
bars that prevent a party from filing an IPR. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
84
Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC, IPR2015-00988 at 34–41.
85
Id. at 41 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 (2011)) (internal quotations
omitted).
86
Cosmo’s attempt to dismiss based on failure to identify all RPIs failed
because those sister CFADs and investors have not been shown to be RPIs in
this proceeding. Id.
87
Decision, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX, Inc., No.
IPR2015-01046 (P.T.A.B. Oct.7, 2015).
88
Patent Owner’s Response, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v.
VirnetX, Inc., No. IPR2015-01046 at 2-13 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015).
89
Because the record does not reflect that Mangrove Fund is precluded from
modifying the named RPIs to include the ones cited by patent owner, and
because Mangrove Fund has not given evidence for whether there are any
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not precluded from modifying its RPIs at a later time if necessary.90
Also like Celgene, VirnetX attempted to argue that the filing of the
petition was improper because Mangrove Fund was only interested
in manipulating stock prices.91 VirnetX sought dismissal based on a
similar theory of statutory interpretation in its preliminary
response, citing language that the Director of the USPTO must
consider the effects on the economy, integrity of the system, and
efficient and timely administration of IPR in 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).92
Together with the language in giving the Director power to
prescribe sanctions for improper use in 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6)93 as
giving the USPTO the authority to sanction and deter this type of
investment strategy that exploits the IPR procedure.94 Again, the
PTAB ruled that financial motivation was the heart of many IPRs,
and stated, “economic motive for challenging a patent does not
itself raise abuse of process issues.”95
So far, the PTAB has announced that purely financial
motivation does not close the door for financiers to file IPR
petitions. It also announced that investment strategy is not a
sanctionable action with regard to claims of abuse of process.
However, the PTAB did not announce a standard for what is, but
additional RPIs. Decision, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX,
Inc., No. IPR2015-01046 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct.7, 2015).
90
Id.
91
Patent Owners Response, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX,
Inc., No. IPR2015-01046 at 14 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015).
92
“In prescribing regulations under this section, the Director shall consider
the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent
system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to
timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(b)
(2012).
93
“Prescribing sanctions for abuse of discovery, abuse of process, or any
other improper use of the proceeding, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or an unnecessary increase in the cost of the proceeding[.]” 35 U.S.C.
§ 316(a)(6) (2012).
94
VirnetX did not allege that Mangrove had filed unmeritorious claims in
their IPR petition. Patent Owners Response, Mangrove Partners Master Fund,
Ltd., No. IPR2015-01046 at 14.
95
Decision, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX, Inc., No.
IPR2015-01046 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct.7, 2015).
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merely implied that frivolous claims may succeed in a motion for
sanctions.
C. Goals of the Strategy and Implications of the Celgene Decision
Not to Sanction
Bass and other financiers use of IPR petitions to exploit the
relatively new AIA is inventive. Although completely invalidating
a company’s patent could cause a massive drop in that company’s
share prices, which could presumably be one of Bass’s ultimate
goals,96 he has had some success in short selling just based on
market fears.97 With some of his recent petitions, Bass has had less
success in causing a drop in stock prices with IPR petitions.98 In
fact, and quite interestingly, some patent owner’s stocks spiked
after news broke of one of Bass’s petitions, casting doubt as to
whether other market factors had larger influences than his
petitions.99 However, this type of gamble is not an uncommon
occurrence.100 Either the market has caught on to his tactic and
compensated for the volatility of dubious patents and the new IPR
proceedings, or it is an overreaction to the initial news that a patent
owned by a pharmaceutical company could be lost.101 However,
with his most recent successes, combing through the empirical data
96

The theory is that a pharmaceutical company’s stock prices will fall after
the market learns that an IPR petition that could invalidate one of their patents
was filed. Additionally, if Bass and CFAD get an IPR instituted, that could also
lead to a drop in stock prices because the chances that the patent may be
invalidated increases. Thus, if the patent was actually invalidated, there could
theoretically be an enormous drop in stock price because a portion of the
pharmaceutical company’s business is now open to competition.
97
Sidak & Skog, supra note 11.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.; Short Interest, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/shortinterest.aspx (updated daily).
101
One could argue that Bass and CFAD are bringing awareness to the market
that they should value patents differently because there exists the opportunity
that some patents are dubious and could be invalidated. Also, the first instance
of Bass and CFAD filing an IPR petition might have been such a novel approach
that the market did not fully understand implications, and market panic allowed
the stock prices to drop. Infra note 105-06; but see infra note 107.
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would be helpful in elucidating how much effect the strategy has
had.
At this time, Bass and his copycats have evaded sanctions
because he has filed every petition with non-frivolous claims.
Preliminary responses arguing abuse of process or improper use of
IPRs have failed since the PTAB’s October ruling denying
Celgene’s motion for sanctions.102 Despite Bass’s announcements
that he uses the CFADs as part of his investment strategy, the goal
of the CFADs to invalidate weak patents for the public good103 is in
line with the stated goals of the AIA, and might provide an extra
barrier against claims of improper use and/or abuse of process.
Furthermore, the PTAB itself announced that motivation, financial
or altruistic, is not a factor when deciding who can file an IPR
petition.104 Moreover, because the PTAB declined to express what
actions constitute an abuse of process within the meaning of 35
U.S.C. § 316(a)(6) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a), motions for sanctions
based on abuse of process currently must fail. In ruling this way,
the PTAB has made it clear that any change with regard to IPR
proceedings should come in the form of direction from Congress.
Although this recent development does not delve into all of the
variables of the stock market and the finer empirical data, Cosmo’s
stock price, which was on the rise from around $147 a share to
$156 a share in late September to early October of 2015, began to
plummet on October 6, and currently stands at just below $144 a
share.105 This price decrease could be in response to the news that
review of a Cosmo patent was instituted,106 and in any case, CFAD
would have made a profit based on that news. However, in light of
CFAD’s and other financier’s recent successes, the USPTO and
102

See, e.g., Coalition for Affordable Drugs III, LLC v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., No. IPR2015-01018 (P.T.A.B. Oct.18, 2015.).
103
By invalidating weak patents, cheaper generic drugs can enter the
marketplace.
104
See supra section III.B.
105
Share
Price
Chart,
COSMO
PHARMACEUTICALS,
http://www.cosmopharmaceuticals.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2015).
106
However, it is unknown whether the price decrease is significant; it might
align with normal fluctuations in the market during this period.
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PTAB may have decided correctly when they interpreted the goals
of the AIA in the denial of Celgene’s motion for sanctions by
placing equal weight between efficiency, cost, and invalidation of
dubious patents by IPR. The next line of inquiry deals with
whether the USPTO, or other branches of government, should do
anything to address this new investment strategy, and what they
can do.
IV.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTION
In determining what measures could be implemented to address
the exploitation of the IPR procedure, governing bodies should
first address whether or not it is advisable to do so. As described
above, some of CFAD’s petitions have failed to cause a drop in
patent holders’ stock prices; some stocks have even spiked after
the news of pending petitions broke.107 Moreover, CFAD has been
granted review of Cosmo’s drug patent, which might be
invalidated to allow cheaper generics to enter the marketplace.108
Now lies the question of whether or not the USPTO should take
further action regarding the exploiting IPRs. If this investment
strategy becomes less and less fruitful, fewer copycats will emerge
and CFAD itself will most likely cease use of the IPR process,
therefore PTAB will not become inundated with challenges
motivated by short sale gains. However, some financiers’ recent
successes in instituting review from their IPR petitions will
probably increase the filing of petitions while taking a short
position on the patent holder’s stock. Bass himself has argued in
his opposition to patent owner’s motion for sanctions brief that
motivations are inconsequential, and argues “[p]oor quality patents
enable pharmaceutical companies to maintain artificially high drug
prices and reap unjust monopoly profits paid for by consumers and

107

Sidak & Skog, supra note 11.
Matthew Bultman, Hedge Fun Group Gets Review of Bowel Disease Drug
Patent, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015, 7:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
712592/hedge-fund-group-gets-review-of-bowel-disease-drug-patent.
108
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taxpayers.” 109 Bass also argues that invalidating “low quality”
patents is one of the express goals of the AIA and IPR process.110
Thus, Bass is betting that he can invalidate one patent, and views
the reward as two-fold, that these tactics will: (1) allow cheaper
generics to come in and lower healthcare costs for consumers; and
(2) make money for his hedge fund. Is it truly an abusive
application of IPR? 111 Since the PTAB explicitly stated that
“[p]rofit is at the heart of nearly every patent and nearly every
[IPR].”112 And if the market is adapting to the new AIA and its IPR
procedures, as well as the CFAD’s strategy, the fear of abuse
might be unwarranted. 113 By not taking a position on the
investment strategy utilized by CFAD and its copycats, the PTAB
might have chosen the preferable course; this path will allow the
market to dictate future responses or enable Congress to step in
and address the issue. This option least frustrates the purposes of
the AIA and the IPR procedures because it still allows any third
109

Ryan Davis, PTAB Decision Not to Sanction Bass Shifts Focus to Capitol,
LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
707985/ptab-decision-not-to-sanction-bass-shifts-focus-to-capitol; Opposition to
patent owner’s motion for sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v.
Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2015).
110
The PTAB agreed with Bass’s arguments, or at least found them more
persuasive than Celgene’s. See Decision denying motion for sanctions, Coalition
for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 25, 2015); Opposition to patent owner’s motion for sanctions, Coalition for
Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 7 (P.T.A.B.
Aug. 11, 2015).
111
On the other side of the argument is that “at the end of the day, a challenge
to a possibly invalid patent is in the public’s best interest.” Decker, supra note 7.
112
Decision denying sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v.
Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015); even a most
innocuous third-party could have financial motivation behind an IPR petition,
for instance, a non-profit that can use a successful invalidation as a selling point
for more donations to their cause; Opposition to Patent Owners Motion for
Sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No.
IPR2015-01092 at 1 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2015) (“Generic pharmaceutical
companies challenge patents to profit from generic sales.”).
113
Ronny Gal, an analyst for Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. stated that “The data
accumulated so far, although early, suggests neither the attention, hyperboles,
nor the legislative cure is warranted.” Decker, supra note 7.
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party to file petitions to invalidate weak patents,114 and this route
also does not alienate legitimate petitioners and organizations with
altruistic motives that might fear sanctions for potential
meritorious claims.
However, letting the market adjust might also allow CFAD and
other financiers to undermine a mission of the USPTO: to advance
American innovation. 115 The USPTO’s limited time 116 and
manpower is spent navigating less-than-sincere claims filed by
these financial-minded 117 third parties with no interest in
innovation by developing the technology contained within the
patent. There is no guarantee that every petition filed by a third
party will reach the merits; 118 which is concerning especially

114

See Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (2011), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-begins-debate-on-leahysmith-america-invents-act.
115
The patent system operates by rewarding innovation by “securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.” General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO
(Oct. 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-informationconcerning-patents#heading-1 (quoting U.S.CONST. art. 1, § 8).
116
See supra, Part I; As prescribed by § 314(b), these petitions must be
addressed within three months after preliminary response. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)
(2012).
117
By financial-minded, I mean people without a legitimate interest in the
technology contained in the patent or industry. Already, some copycat financiers
have borrowed CFAD’s strategy and filed petitions. Michelle Carniaux, PTAB
Crashers: A Look at How They Are Doing In the PTAB, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 19,
2015)
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=89b0247b-5614-4819a0f2-bd3f999e6a4e. One of which, Mangrove Partners Master Fund Ltd.,
succeeded where Apple did not, and was granted review of a network security
patent. Davis, supra note 12.
118
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed
under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1
of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). Because the
PTAB declined to furnish a rule for when petitions become sanctionable, any
petitioner with a semi-meritorious claim is not deterred from filing a petition,
and if they are a financially-minded third party, such as a hedge fund that
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considering that the PTAB has not established a standard for abuse
of process other than implicitly suggesting that frivolous claims
might be sanctionable. 119 Therefore, without action, Congress
might have created something they sought to destroy by
introducing the AIA: a next generation IPR troll.
This next-gen troll could contravene the mission of the USPTO
and actually stymie innovation. Any patent owner will need to
allocate more funds for legal counsel in anticipation of action from
next-gen trolls, which will detract from research and development
of innovative technologies. For example, small companies that
have become enticing targets will find it harder to afford the
representation they need. For those companies, devoting
significant resources to defending their patents even in an IPR
proceeding could cripple their research efforts. An IPR troll might
also act similarly to the patent troll, threatening patent owners with
IPR petitions in an effort to negotiate settlements not to file.
Furthermore, investing in targeted companies could be chilled if
investors realize patents are under imminent threat at the hands of
industry outsiders.120 Because there are currently no clear standards
constituting a sanctionable use of IPR procedure, some attorneys
believe it is currently open season for trolls to emerge.121 Despite
potential benefits of nonintervention and allowing the market to
adjust, intervention may be necessary, if only to prevent the rise of
next-gen IPR trolls.

partakes in short selling, there is no way to police the exploitation that could
inundate the PTAB.
119
See Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs II, LLC v. Cosmo
Technologies Ltd., IPR2015-00988 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2015) at 5-10; see, e.g.,
Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v.
Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092, (Sept. 25, 2015).
120
Investors with a stake in the company might be wary of injecting further
funds in the company if they are afraid that any person could invalidate patents.
Potential investors would be repelled if they knew that the company was being
targeted by IPR petitions because it could give the appearance of weak patent
rights.
121
Davis, supra note 108.
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V.
METHODS OF INTERVENTION
Next, this Recent Development considers the various methods
by which the IPR process may be altered to address exploitation by
outside parties looking to manipulate and cash in on stocks. Four
administrative paths are readily available through: 122 (1) the
USPTO; (2) the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”);
(3) judicial review; and (4) Congressional action.
A. Administrative Action Through USPTO Regulation
The USPTO has the power to establish regulations concerning
the proceedings at the Office.123 Additionally, 35 U.S.C. § 316(b),
governing conduct of IPR, states that “[i]n prescribing regulations
under this section, the Director shall consider the effect of any such
regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the
efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office
to timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.”124
Although the PTAB declined to announce new regulations or
policy changes to deter short selling investment strategies when it
delivered the written decision in the Celgene sanctions motion, the
PTAB can still implement new regulations and policies should it
deem the widespread use of CFAD’s investment strategy as
exploitative and abusive. 125 Whether the PTAB correctly
interpreted the statutes cited in its ruling denying sanctions

122

Although neither an extensive nor exhaustive list, these four paths are the
most feasible options.
123
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012); “[T]he broadest of the Office’s rulemaking
powers is the power to establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which
. . . shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office . . . [b]y this grant of
power we understand Congress delegated plenary authority over PTO
practice[.]” Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal
quotations omitted).
124
35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012).
125
The agency can still propose a policy change through rulemaking pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012); rules are defined as “[A]n agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or
practice requirements of an agency . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012).

17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 132
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review
requires that its interpretation pass the Chevron test.126 In Chevron,
the Supreme Court elucidated a two-step test for evaluating an
agency’s statutory interpretation: (1) whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue, and (2) if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court to decide is whether the agency’s interpretation is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.127 The PTAB’s
interpretation of § 311 meant that any third party could file a
petition, especially when compared to business method reviews128
requiring standing pursuant to AIA § 18(a)(1)(B).129 The PTAB
concluded the AIA “was designed to encourage the filing of
meritorious patentability challenges, by any person who is not the
patent owner, in an effort to further improve patent quality.”130
Given the statutory language in § 311(a) granting “a person who is
not the owner of a patent” the ability to file, PTAB’s interpretation
likely passes Chevron, and any reviewing court would likely defer
to the PTAB’s interpretations. Even if there was ambiguity, the
fact that Congress implemented a standing requirement for covered
business methods review but not IPR, points to a permissible
construction of why IPR was not intended to have standing
requirements.
With USPTO interventions, there are two related inquiries:
first, one must ask whether agency action contravenes its statutory
126

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
127
Id. at 842–43.
128
Covered business methods patents are defined as a patent having claims:
(1) used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
service, and (2) that do not claim a “technological invention.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.301(a); unlike IPR, they do not cover technological patents, and have an
extra standing requirement that the petitioner must be sued or charged with
infringement. Major Differences Between IPR, PGR, and CBM, USPTO,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:jsuVmflOpfYJ:www.us
pto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/aia_trial_comparison_chart.pptx+&cd=
3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited on Oct. 5, 2015).
129
Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs, VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.,
IPR2015-01092 at 3–4 (P.T.A.B. Sept 25, 2015).
130
Id. at 4–5 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 85 (2011).

17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 133
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review
grant of power; and second, one should examine an agency’s
possible solutions. The first line of inquiry asks whether Congress
delegated the USPTO power to make any of the above proposed
regulations. Congress has delegated power to the USPTO to
regulate proceedings within the Office.131 Additionally, pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4), the Director can prescribe regulations
establishing and governing IPR.132 Lastly, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 316(b), the director, in establishing regulations, will take into
account the effect on the economy, the integrity of the patent
system, and the efficiency of the Office.133
Having determined that the USPTO does have the power to
intervene, there should be a balancing test weighing the effect on
the economy against the interest in maintaining integrity of the
patent system. Economic effect is double-edged sword: short
selling stocks is a legal and regulated activity,134 but economic
effect must also account for incentivizing technological
innovations of the United States by providing robust patent rights.
Similarly, while the integrity of the patent system is compromised
when financiers can exploit the IPR process in a way not
envisioned by Congress when it passed the AIA. At the same time,
the integrity of the patent system is bolstered because any party
can find and eliminate weak patents. If the issue persists and gains
momentum, the PTAB might need to propose regulations to halt
the investment strategy, increasing USPTO efficiency in the long
run. If the PTAB continues to allow anyone to file petitions, more
next-gen IPR trolls will be attracted and likely slow down a very
enticing alternative to litigation that the AIA was intended to
create.

131

See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012); “The Director shall be responsible for
providing policy direction . . . for the Office and for the issuance of patents . . . .
The Director shall perform these duties in a fair, impartial, and equitable
manner.” 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2012).
132
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2012).
133
35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012).
134
Key Points About Regulation SHO, SEC (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/regsho.htm.

17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 134
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review
By declining to impose guidelines for sanctionable abuses of
process, the PTAB has effectively thrust the issue back to
Congress. As of today, the PTAB has also decided to stress that the
motivation to invalidate weak patents is more relevant than an
efficient alternative to litigation; whether or not that position
changes given the increased usage of IPR remains to be
determined. If the USPTO’s position changes, the agency can
intervene to curtail petitions filed by uninterested third parties.
1. USPTO Implementation of a Standing Requirement
CFAD had argued, and the PTAB agreed, that the PTAB
cannot currently sanction CFAD’s activity because its actions were
consistent with § 311(a) and were pursuant to stated goals of the
AIA. 135 Here, the USPTO can implement a gatekeeping
requirement that only parties with a real interest in the technology
underlying the challenged patent can bring IPR petitions. If the
AIA implemented IPRs in part to eliminate low quality patents,136
it follows that the most knowledgeable, and therefore successful,
petitioners that can best eliminate those patents come from within
the industry the patent resides.137 Therefore, a check on exploitative
petitions could come by instituting a policy that required a
demonstrated showing that petitioner’s RPIs are from that field, or
have at least a minimum rationale for why they are linked to that
field.138 This RPI requirement would ensure the integrity of the
135

Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs, VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.,
IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. Sept 25, 2015).
136
A goal that was stressed by the PTAB in their ruling not to impose
sanctions on the CFAD. See id.
137
Given the fact that the majority of the IPR petitions filed by financiers are
denied review, there is some sense that those intimately attuned to the
underlying science and technology contained in a patent may be better suited to
challenge them. See Chart, http://interpartesreviewblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/ChartUpdated2.png.
138
This may function as a carve-out exception for organization intending to
benefit the public by invalidating weak patents, because they would have at least
a minimum rationale linking them with the industry. However, it is worth noting
that the CFADs were created with that same motive, but the distinction lies with
the fact that eventually, the CFAD’s RPIs, Bass and Spangenberg, would be
directly connected with hedge funds. There exists one interesting loophole: the
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patent system in two ways. This system would ensure (1) weak
patents are invalidated, and (2) that no party exploits a process
within the USPTO for pecuniary gain ancillary to innovation.
2. Rulemaking that Bars Hedge Funds or Short Sellers from
Making IPR Petitions
Currently, the feelings fostered by the pharmaceutical
companies surrounding who can file IPR petitions can be reduced
to one argument: one should not be able to use IPR for pecuniary
gain through hedge funds, short selling, or other financial
instruments.139 The USPTO may implement a regulation that bars
the party filing the IPR petition from operating a hedge fund or
operating a strategy for shorting stocks. This proposal seeks to
expand the PTAB’s discretion by allowing discovery motions
during initial stages of examining a petition. The pharmaceutical
companies are upset because Bass uses his CFADs to “hide” his
true intentions and sources of funds.140 However, the PTAB has
rarely granted motions for discovery in order to explore “hidden”
RPIs. 141 By granting more limited motions of discovery, the
USPTO could let patent owners uncover if a hedge fund or short
seller is a RPI in the petition. This regulation is narrowly tailored
to only affect one group of people. However, if the PTAB needed
to grant more discovery motions, it might be inconsistent at times
with speedy and inexpensive resolution of proceedings pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).142 Currently, of all the financiers that have
filed IPR petitions, only Bass has filed a petition using a different
company than his hedge fund.143 The USPTO may implement new

scenario where a hedge fund manager teams up with an industry practitioner to
challenge patents.
139
See, e.g., Julia La Roche, Kyle Bass eviscerates a drug company’s of his
short-selling its stock, BUSINESS INSIDER, FINANCE (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/kyle-bass-response-to-celgene-motion-2015-8.
140
Thakker & Ellison, supra note 83 at 4.
141
Id.
142
37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (2015) (“This part shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”).
143
Chart, supra note 136.
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policies and regulations if it ever finds that the short selling
investment strategy becomes too much of a burden on the PTAB.
B. The Role of the SEC with Regard to CFAD’s Investment
Strategy
So far, the SEC has remained curiously silent throughout the
proceedings taking place at the intersection of the USPTO and
financiers. The SEC may not have the tools it needs to effectively
bring any claim against hedge funds and financiers. The two
theories that could apply are extremely attenuated and nuanced at
best: stock manipulation and insider trading.144
The “word ‘manipulative’ . . . under SEC Rule 10b-5 . . . refers
generally to practices that were intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity.”145 A “misrepresentation or
omission is material if there is substantial likelihood that [a]
reasonable investor would have acted differently if
misrepresentation had not been made or truth had been
disclosed.” 146 Scienter is proven by demonstrating defendant’s

144

Nuanced and attenuated because neither theory has yet been applied by the
SEC in this situation, it is likely to be one of first impression.
145
See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that in
order to prevail on claim of securities fraud, the SEC must establish the
following elements: (1) misrepresentation or omission, (2) of material fact, (3)
made with scienter).
146
See Armstrong v. Am. Pallet Leasing Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Iowa
2009). Because reasonable investors would consider facts important in deciding
whether to invest in a corporation’s stock, misrepresentations and omissions
were material within meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 78j and SEC Rule 10b-5 when a
corporation’s executives make representations to potential purchasers of
corporation’s outstanding stock involving false quarterly reports distorting true
earnings, condition of a major division, antitrust litigation against that division,
performance of a new product, and denial of a patent for such product. See Alna
Capital Assoc. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff’d. in part,
rev’d. in part on other grounds, 758 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1985).
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misconduct was knowing or intentional, or had the “intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud investors.”147
In its Patent Owner’s Brief, NPS Pharmaceuticals argued that
Bass and his CFADs were in fact conducting stock manipulation,
prohibited by the SEC. NPS argued that the investment strategy is
market manipulation because Bass “knows that an IPR can cause a
stock’s price to fall,” and that Bass controls the timing of the stock
price falling because he controls the timing of IPR petition filing.148
NPS also argued that Bass violated SEC Rule 10b-5 when he made
misrepresentations about invalidating NPS’s patents and inviting
cheaper generics into the market, when he cannot be sure of the
outcome.149 On October 23, 2015, the PTAB decided to institute
review, while declining to address the issues of manipulation
presented by NPS.150
Under a traditional theory of insider trading, § 10(b) and SEC
Rule 10b-5 “are violated when a corporate insider trades in the
securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information.” 151 Moreover, “[t]he misappropriation theory holds
that a person commits fraud in connection with a securities
transaction when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source
of the information.”152

147

See Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1984); “‘[S]cienter’ is
defined as mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”
SEC v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380 (D. Colo. 2004).
148
Corrected Patent Owner’s Brief at 5, Coalition for Affordable Drugs II,
LLC v. NPS Pharm., Inc., IPR2015-00990, (P.T.A.B Sept. 14, 2015).
149
Id. at 6.
150
See Coalition for Affordable Drugs II, LLC v. NPS Pharm., Inc., IPR201500990, (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2015).
151
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (U.S. 1997).
152
“The misappropriation theory is thus designed to protect the integrity of
the securities markets against abuses by outsiders to a corporation who have
access to confidential information that will affect the corporation’s security price
when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation’s
shareholders.” Id. at 653 (internal quotations omitted).
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CFAD’s activity likely fails elements of market manipulation
based on fraud or misrepresentations because CFAD’s IPR
petitions are not misrepresentations. CFAD had merit to file each
of its IPR petitions; otherwise the pharmaceutical companies
would have alleged frivolous claims. Furthermore, because
materiality is heavily fact-dependent, a pending legitimate IPR
petition is but one fact a jury weighs in determining whether an
investor would have purchased stock, and is far too speculative at
the stage of deciding whether or not to institute review. The case
for insider trading is likely one of first impression because IPR is a
new proceeding in patent law. While Bass and other financiers
may know they intend to file IPR petitions, current insider trading
laws do not contemplate that behavior; instead, they only
acknowledge nonpublic information from an inside source.
C. Judicial Review
Another way to deter exploitation of the IPR process is waiting
for judicial review. Congress delegated the task of interpreting
statutes, such as the AIA, to the courts in addition to the USPTO;
this has been “evident since 1982, when Congress created a single
specialized court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, to hear all appeals in patent cases.”153 However, patent
cases can arise and be tried in district courts as well. There are pros
and cons with policymaking from judicial review. Because
technology and science are highly specialized and technical fields,
fact-finding is sometimes complicated with arguments over
terminology.154 Furthermore, a district court may have considerably
153

Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1238 (2012); see also
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1116–20 (2003) (discussing
analogies between the patent and antitrust statutes and stating that “the patent
statute, as currently structured, contemplates . . . judicial development of patent
common law”).
154
The court acknowledged that the specific meaning of words in patent
claims might be disputed, and external factual evidence might be needed to
explain the meaning of the term. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, supra note 152.
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less expertise than the USPTO or special committees in
Congress.155 However, a court is not clouded by the politics that
Congress or agencies can experience, and therefore can evaluate
issues impartially. Courts examine issues one at a time, and
judicial opinions are crafted to set policy and offer guidance on
those individual issues. A final hurdle for a court-issued policy
change is that the Federal Circuit needs the right case to come
before it. Currently, there are no actionable claims that companies
targeted by CFAD, and other third-party financiers, can bring
before a court. The decision by the PTAB to not institute IPR
review, such as the one garnered in the Celgene case, may not be
appealed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). 156 However, pending
cases may be directly appealable to the Federal Circuit in the near
future. Both CFAD’s petition against Cosmo and Mangrove
Fund’s petition against VirnetX had review instituted by the
PTAB. 157 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), “[i]f an inter partes
review is instituted . . . the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall
issue a final written decision . . . .”158 That final written decision is
directly appealable to the Federal Circuit by the party losing the
IPR. 159 If either patent owner loses its review, that owner can
appeal before the Federal Circuit for clarification of statute, or any
other argument the party wishes to put forward. However, there are
155

Technical training is not only rare within chambers, but also highly
focused on a single area of expertise; one cannot expect a clerk or judge to have
a wide range of technical knowledge beyond his or her discipline. Id.
156
“The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes
review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)
(2012); see, e.g., St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749
F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding denial of petition for inter partes review
was not “final written decision” of Patent Trial and Appeal Board under 35
U.S.C. § 318(a)). It should be noted that these statutes are silent as to whether a
motion for sanctions is appealable.
157
See discussion of both cases supra Part III.
158
35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012).
159
35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012) (stating that “[a] party
to an inter partes review . . . who is dissatisfied with the final written decision of
the [PTAB] . . . may appeal the Board’s decision only to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”) (emphasis added).
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no guarantees for the court to provide new regulations or policy
change. For instance, if a patent owner wishes to challenge the
PTAB interpretation of § 311(a) giving any person the ability to
file an IPR petition, the Federal Circuit will likely defer to the
PTAB’s interpretation of the statute. Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit may choose to completely ignore any questions of statutory
interpretation or the exploitation of IPR. Instead, it can review just
the merits of the claims. But the avenue exists as a way to
implement a policy change, especially if the landscape changes
dramatically to inundate the PTAB in the time it takes for a case to
reach the courts.
D. Congressional Action
Congress can enact legislation to reform the patent system and
curtail the strategies that Bass and copycats employ to short
stock.160 Because the PTAB’s ruling denying Celgene’s motion for
sanctions and announcing that the PTAB loosely interprets 35
U.S.C. § 311(a) to grant petitions filing rights to any person, and
that the PTAB currently takes no position on the motivations of
potential IPR petitioners, Congressional action may be the only
viable avenue available for reform.161 Since the start of the 114th
Congress, four new bills focused on patent reform have been
introduced.162 Recently, the four bills have been reduced to two,
160

See U.S. CONST. art. I.
Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI,
LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Sept 25, 2015). This
is viable not because other avenues are closed, but rather because the USPTO
seems to have thrust this job to Congress rather than making their own
regulation when the PTAB stated that “Congress did not limit inter partes
reviews to parties having a specific competitive interest in the technology
covered by the patents,” and the CFAD’s petition is “consistent with the
proposition that Article III standing is not a requirement to appear before [the
PTAB] . . . .” See id. “Short of there being legislative action, this activity is
going to continue . . . I continue to believe that the only fix for this issue is
through an act of Congress[.]” Davis, supra note 12 (internal quotations
omitted).
162
The Innovation Act, the Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship
(PATENT) Act, the TROL Act, and the STRONG Act. Tony Dutra, Three Areas
161
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one each in the House of Representatives 163 and Senate. 164 The
Senate bill does not address the IPR procedure. The House Bill
(“H.R.9”), seemingly in response to Bass and other financiers,
takes up the challenge of reforming the IPR procedure head-on. It
is proposing to effectively ban financiers from the IPR procedure
by seeking to amend parts of § 316(a) of the AIA governing IPRs
by introducing the qualifier: “[that petitioner and RPIs] do not own
and will not acquire a financial instrument . . . that is designed to
hedge or offset any decrease in the market value of an equity
security of the patent owner[.]”165 Both bills seem to be losing
support.166
One method to amend 35 U.S.C. § 311 is to impose a standing
requirement on the IPR procedure that only RPIs with a real
competitive interest in the underlying technology contained in the
patent be allowed to file petitions.167 However, that proposal is too
far-reaching. Instituting such a drastic change would contravene
the AIA’s goal of invalidating weak patents that should never have
been issued because genuinely altruistic third parties (such as
of Patent Trolling Behavior, Can Four Bills Become One?, LIFE SCIENCES LAW
& INDUSTRY REPORT (May 15, 2015), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/
results/149c08eefe580308b77677b1629b9efa/document/X3LJ2K7K000000?jcse
arch=dk%253Abna%2520a0g5z8q8t7#jcite.
163
The
Innovation
Act,
H.R.
9,
114th
Cong.
(2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/9/text.
164
The
PATENT
Act,
S.
1137,
114th
Cong.
(2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1137; see also Lisa
Patel & Sid Venkatesan, Patent Reform Tries Again, TECH CRUNCH (Sept. 13,
2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/13/patent-reform-tries-again/.
165
The
Innovation
Act,
H.R.
9,
114th
Cong.
(2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/9/text.
166
“The House’s patent reform bill appears dead in the water for now, partly
due to biopharma’s demand for a carve out from the inter partes review process
that Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte rejected.” Brett Norman & Sarah Karlin,
As Congress Returns, Patent Reform Hits the Skids POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/prescription-pulse/2015/09/proprescriptionpulsesept8-karlin-norman-210101.
167
Courtenay B. Brinckerhoff, Stricter Standing for Inter Partes Review?,
PHARMAPATENTS (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2015/04/
14/stricter-standing-for-inter-partes-review/.
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groups for public interest) would be barred from petitioning. The
current iteration of H.R.9 seems to deal with IPR petitions by
hedge fund managers taking short positions because it narrowly
tailors a rule that only bars those that aim to profit off of that
activity. However, Congress can also elect to address the issue
with by explicit means. They can amend § 316(a)(6) and define a
boundary, or task the USPTO to establish a boundary that clearly
encompasses what they consider to be a sanctionable abuse of the
IPR process. Congress should pursue this path because it gives the
USPTO more discretion to determine which parties have crossed
that line into abusive tactics instead of declaring a whole group of
potential petitioners banned from the IPR procedure. While
Congress’s slow pace is its pitfall, it is also its virtue. A bill is
debated, all angles get covered, experts are consulted, and the
resulting legislation is a more wholesome remedy that hopefully
functions as expected. This Recent Development proposes that the
USPTO and PTAB were correct in the Celgene ruling to not
impose sanctions. The PTAB was also wise to forgo
announcements of any conclusive policy changes regarding
investment strategies used by financiers until more data about the
effect on the market and the IPR system can be analyzed. Finally,
the PTAB’s decision in waiting for Congress to provide guidance
and address the issue was the best choice because the PTAB
remains neutral on a controversial issue of public interest.168
168

See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/ business/ahuge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html?_r=0; Charley Grant,
Why a 2,000% Drug-Price Increase Raises New Questions for Mallinckrodt, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-a-2000-drug-price-increase-raises-new-questions-for-mallinckrodt-1447791542;
Priyanka Dayal McCluskey, As competition wanes, prices for generics skyrocket,
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/11/
06/generic-drug-price-increases-alarm-insurers-providers-and-consumers/H3iA9CS
xAUylnCdGjLNKVN/story.html.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
After investigating Bass’s hedge fund strategy and whether or
not an abuse of process was really in play, this Recent
Development has determined that it is best left to Congress to act
to establish guidelines as to what constitutes an abuse of process
and what constitutes actions that are sanctionable. Further, after
discussing several options for intervention, this Recent
Development concludes that the PTAB was wise to follow
Congressional motivations in the adoption of the AIA to interpret
their statutes. The PTAB effectively declined to establish a
position on the exploitative use of IPR in short sales, and is instead
waiting for Congressional intervention to address the issue
surrounding prevention of the exploitation of the IPR procedure for
purely financial gain.
To find the best solution, further research should look at the
empirical data resulting from Bass’s investment strategy and
determine the viability and sustainability of the strategy in
describing the potential effects on the USPTO. Notably, much of
what lies ahead will be based on pending cases; the majority of
Bass’s actions are currently before the PTAB, and many other
financiers also have petitions pending. Once the PTAB issues more
decisions, including some final decisions on patent claim validity,
more pieces of this interesting puzzle will be revealed and any
adjustment comes from their conclusions.

